Disastrous Management of not so Natural disaster
Not a ‘natural’ disaster
Business Standard , August 28, 2008,
Floods, often deemed mistakenly as natural disasters, are the result mostly of human misadventure in the river catchments, and the neglect of water systems. The catastrophe caused by the turbulent Kosi river in north Bihar, after breaching its embankment at Kusaha, near the Bhimnagar barrage in Nepal, is a typical example. The breach in its eastern bund has caused the river to change its course and gush eastwards as a torrent to drown unsuspecting towns and villages in a vast stretch, affecting over 2 million people and leading to heavy loss of life and property. The consequent peril, unparalleled in scale and having more ominous portents in store, is the result of heavy silting that has been putting pressure on the river’s spurs and bunds since 1985. Shockingly, instead of taking remedial measures in the catchment area to curb silting, officials have been undertaking bund strengthening work year after year. Now that the inevitable has happened, engineers find it difficult to plug the opening that has already widened to nearly 3 km and is growing by over 200 metres a day. If the widening breach reaches the Bhimnagar barrage, just 12 km away, the huge, thickly inhabited expanse around the districts of Supaul, Saharsa, Araria, Madhepura, Katihar and Purnea will be submerged. What heightens this danger is the frail state of the Bhimnagar barrage itself, which crossed its estimated life span of 30 years some 22 years ago as it was built in Nepalese territory by India in 1956.
It is not just the scale of the Kosi disaster that is exceptional; for the new course that the mighty Kosi is charting is unusual. Unlike the past, when the river invariably shifted its stream westwards, this time it is moving eastwards, inundating otherwise flood-safe areas, and heading with enormous force towards the Ganga, about 100 km away.
It is unfortunate that the fluid geo-political situation in the Nepal-Bihar border belt should come in the way of carrying out repairs to the damaged embankment, which have to be undertaken by India in Nepalese territory. That the Centre should take so long to raise the issue of local resistance to repair work with the Nepalese authorities after the occurrence of the breach on August 18 is all the more regrettable.
The Kosi catastrophe should be taken as a warning to be prepared to face similar situations in other river basins. The unabated deposition of silt is raising the beds of almost all Indian rivers, curtailing their water-holding capacity and enhancing the danger of flooding the adjoining areas even in the event of a marginal increase in the water inflow. Besides, the pressure on land due to a growing population is forcing human habitations to move towards the flood plains of rivers and even on to the riverbeds, heightening the scope for flood damage. Considering the frequent visitations of river disasters in different parts of the country, especially during the monsoon season, a long-term policy for the conservation of vegetative cover and re-greening of denudated catchments is essential. Such a measure alone can slow down the rates of both siltation and water inflows into the rivers. Otherwise, the recurrence of Kosi-like catastrophes will be difficult to avert
National Disastrous Management
Shishir Gupta, August 27, 2008 , Indian Express
Bihar floods again showcase how to kill a good idea
Floods, contrary to popular and perhaps television perception, are not unmitigated bad news because they are symbols and substance of water regeneration — a big plus in a country that has low water table in some parts and will be a big water consumer globally in the near future. But of course, floods, such as those caused by the Kosi river in north Bihar, also challenge the administration’s capacity to protect lives, livelihoods and homes. Two million people are reportedly homeless because of the Kosi floods and the official count for the dead has already reached three figures.
The Kosi breached its embankment at Kushala, about 13 km upstream of the Kosi barrage on the Nepalese side on August 18. That was the day Prachanda was taking oath as Nepal’s new PM. Nothing was done then and the blame game has begun now.
New Delhi is blaming Kathmandu for not allowing Bihar government engineers to reinforce the embankment once the river started attacking its spurs around August 15-16. The Bihar government is cross with the Centre as the latter did not take up the matter seriously enough with Nepal. And Kathmandu is angry with New Delhi for not maintaining the Kosi barrage and its embankment, given to New Delhi on 199 years lease, during the dry season.
The facts are as follows: Bihar government engineers were late in starting embankment enforcement operations; Nepalese customs took its sweet time letting the material through; the breach was within the Kosi-Tapu sanctuary, restricting operations; and the Nepalese workforce weren’t willing to work as an emergency demands.
Damage done, where were the forces of national disaster management? A 235-strong force landed 48 hours after the breach and flooding on August 18. But warnings had been sounded around Independence Day.
In another emergency earlier, a national disaster management force took four hours to reach Kullu, Himachal Pradesh; the stampede in the Naina Devi temple had claimed 141 lives by then. Yes, India’s response to the 2004 tsunami or even the 2000 Bhuj earthquake was credible. But, in general, something’s very rotten in disaster management administration.
Rats have a major presence in the headquarters of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) at Centaur Hotel, Delhi. NDMA was set up in December 2005 and has the prime minister as its chairman. Its executive head is General (Retd) N.C. Vij, former Indian army chief. NDMA has 10 members, and Vij holds ex-officio rank of minister of state.
In terrorism-related incidents, NDMA doesn’t come in directly. These are handled by the disaster management cell under the home ministry which liaises with the concerned state. NDMA is supposed to have control of an eight-unit paramilitary force, called the National Disaster Response Force (NDRF). Four units are trained to handle nuclear, biological and chemical disasters. These battalions, divided into 18 teams, have been raised via personnel from CISF, ITBP, BSF and CRPF. The eighth battalion is still being raised. The teams are stationed in Pune, Kolkata, Delhi, Vadodara, Mindli, Gauwhati, Chandigarh and Patna. This is the theory. But there are no dedicated airlift capabilities or equipment. That’s why the response team to Naina Devi, travelling via road, was at least four hours late.
The national disaster management policy has been with the UPA government since December 20, 2007 but it has not yet been cleared. Three years after the setting up of NDMA, the government has only now in principle approved the post of the director general, NDRF. Fourteen ministries have been sent policy papers but as of now only one ministry appears to have had the time to respond to NDMA.
Little wonder then that General Vij told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh last year that he would rather quit than be blamed for NDMA’s incompetence at a later date. The home ministry is tasked to service NDMA. But it still believes in the old thesis of district magistrates being nodal actors.
NDMA initiated a dialogue with the health ministry for better medical and ambulance services and extending civil defence facilities to all the districts, as opposed to only 100 towns now. That exercise is still a work-in-progress. By the way, we still don’t know the epidemiological roots of the 1994 Surat plague virus.
That most construction in India happens without a disaster audit is another scary anomaly that apparently scares no one. Statistics like these will be taken seriously only when NDMA is fully autonomous, has a separate budget, and is considered powerful enough to receive ministry cooperation.
shishir.gupta@expressindia.com
http://www.indianexpress.com/story/353623.html
A Bend In The River : N K SINGH
1 Sep 2008 Times of India
The floods in north Bihar are back. Each year, Bihar faces a cycle of destruction, involuntary displacement, migration and large-scale loss of human life, cattle, crops and infrastructure. Even within this recurrent theme of annual misery, the Kosi river breaching its embankment has been catastrophic – a disaster unprecedented in living memory.
The Kosi, emanating in the Himalayas, is a part of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, Meghna riverine system, which carries within its fold a population of 1.3 billion people spread across five countries, including China, and is home to some of the world’s poorest. The Kosi is one of the tributaries of the Ganges and travels through the upper mountainous regions in Nepal before entering the plains of Bihar and merging with the Gangesseveral hundred kilometres downstream. Given the crystalline nature of the rock and its young morphology, it carries in its path large quantities of silt and other matter which are not alluvial and of infertile nature. This silt is deposited in the plains of Bihar. The trouble is further compounded by the steep gradient from which the river emerges and enters the Bihar plains. Its large deposits of silt and gradient force the river to meander along unpredictable paths thus earning for itself the name of ‘river of sorrow’.
The first credible attempt to tame the river began in 1956 after the devastating floods of 1954. Jawaharlal Nehru directed the Central Water Commission to prepare a feasibility project to suggest a long-term solution. The mandarins of the Central Water Commission did a hydrological survey and prepared a report of that region. The commission suggested the construc-tion of a high dam (239 metre) at Barakshetra about 50 km within Nepal to be backed by a barrage downstream. For several reasons, including cost, a focus on to the Bhakra Nangal project and the complexities in the construction of multiple structures, this option was shelved.
As an interim arrangement, the government settled on a barrage at Hanuman Nagar, Birpur. Thus, the first credible attempt to tame the river began in 1956 with an eastern and a western embankment of 105 and 106 km respectively of which about 32 km of the eastern embankment is in Nepal. These embankments were completed in 1959. Thebarrage at Birpur to regulate water flow wasfinished in 1964. The Indo-Nepalese agreement between the two countries, which facilitated this project, brought benefits to both India and Nepal. The Nepalese side, however, continued to question the benefits from the project. Nepal had all along wanted a barrage system further upstream which they believed would have yielded more optimum returns.
It was understood that, apart from a limited life of 25 years for the barrage, the arrangement was at best a temporary one which needed to be complemented by more durable measures.The core question is: Why did the permanent arrangements fail to take off despite the incalculable multiplier effects both for the economy of India and Nepal? There are several reasons for this. First, while the Nepalese were more friendly with India in the 1950s and 60s and even till the completion of the barrage, subsequently Indo-Nepalese relations became much more uncertain. The two neighbours began to view each other with suspicion. Repeated attempts by New Delhi to settle this issue during the several Indo-Nepalese commission discussions and other forums did not evoke much response.
Second, attempts to engage multilateral institutions like the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank did not cut ice with the ministry of external affairs, which felt that this would unnecessarily internationalise an issue which lay in the bilateral domain of India and Nepal. Thus, while bilateral diplomacy remained stalled for various reasons, multilateral institutions, which were keen to help a project that would benefit several countries including India and Nepal, remained mired in misplaced geopolitical sensitivities. This was unpardonable considering the issue was anatural resource like water.
Third, environmental lobbies gathered momentum during the early 1990s and building high dams lost favour. Initiatives of multilateral insti-tutions could not overcome growing environmental concern and civil society resistance. Finally, the simple fact that apart from the multiplierbenefits to agriculture, flood protection and livelihood patterns to both people of India and Nepal, a substantial part of the hydro-electricity of 3,000 MW could be sold by Nepal to India tobring about huge improvement in real income of Nepalese and meet the energy deficiencies of the eastern region failed to carry conviction.
Will the current catastrophe, which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has appropriately called a ¶calamity of national proportion¶, lead to a rethink? Will the stalled efforts of five decades gather new momentum? This problem, which has a massive human dimension, needs to transcend contemporary political compulsions. Downstream riparian countries, which face ecological disaster, need international support to supplement bilateral efforts. We need to transcend the limited approach of departmental jurisdiction and deeply embedded suspicions of the past.
The need of the hour is an aggressive and fresh initiative to tame India’s ‘river of sorrow’.
The writer is deputy chairman, Planning Commission, Bihar.
After the Deluge :Times of India Editorial
1 Sep 2008
A river in spate is a fearsome sight. But what if it breaches a barrage, changes its flow and revertsback to a channel that’s about 100 km away from its present course. The rampaging Kosi has left at least 2.5 million people marooned in eight districts of Bihar and has inundated 65,000 hectares. It is a national calamity, as the prime minister said.
The Kosi story, currently unravelling with tragic dimensions in northern Bihar, is all this and much more. Sure, blame the Kosi – a young river not quite settled in its course and with a history of shifting course once every 50-100 years, flowing fast from Nepal with a massive amount of silt – for this tragedy.
But what explains the callousness of the state administration in allowing the river to dictate terms to the people living on its banks? The first sign of breach in the Kosi’s eastern embankment in Nepal happened on August 18, but the state government woke up to it only a week later. Media reports indicate that the state’s water resources department declared all embankments under its supervision as safe just two days before the Kosi called the bluff. Floods are annual features, and, indeed, that’s reason enough for us to be prepared to face them. Yet, year after year, rivers in flood expose our faulty plans, breach embankments built at enormous cost, destroy lives and livelihoods, ravage farmland and wipe out communities.
The immediate need is to take care of the millions of people who have to be evacuated from the flooded areas and provide them with food and shelter. Reports suggest that rescue teams don’t have enough boats and sufficient shelters. Mischief-makers are taking advantage of the crisis and engaged in extortion and looting. Helicopters and boats to tents, food, drinking water and medicines are desperately needed. The government should not shy from calling for international help if necessary.
The Kosi tragedy raises fundamental questions about our flood relief measures. Scores of barrages and embankments have been built across the country to tame rivers with a history of floods. Is this the best way to control floods? There is a view that embankments are not just ecologically unsound but may also aggravate floods. Barrages and dams, especially the ones on Himalayan rivers, have to be desilted regularly to be effective. Many officials responsible for carrying out these works,including maintaining embankments, are corrupt and insensitive to the plight of people living in flood-prone areas. New forms of flood management, with the involvement of stakeholders like people living on river banks and farmers, may be necessary to plug the leaks in the present system. The curse of the Kosi – or any other river – is not inevitable.
